
















Abatement Technology and 
the Environment-Growth 
Nexus with Education 
By Xavier Pautrel, Université de 
Nantes, Laboratoire d’Économie et de 
Management de Nantes (LEMNA), 
Institut d’Économie et de Management 







 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it 
 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Series 
Editor: Carlo Carraro 
 
Abatement Technology and the Environment-Growth 
Nexus with Education 
By Xavier Pautrel, Université de Nantes, Laboratoire d’Économie et de 
Management de Nantes (LEMNA), Institut d’Économie et de 
Management de Nantes – IAE, France 
 
Summary 
This article challenges the conventional result that a tighter environmental tax has no long-
run effect on human capital accumulation in the presence of pollution arising from final 
output production. It demonstrates that the technology used in the abatement sector 
determines the existence and the direction of the growth-effect. A tighter environmental tax 
rises (respectively reduces) human capital accumulation in the presence of pollution arising 
from final production, if the abatement sector is relatively more intensive in human (resp. 
physical) capital than final sector. That result always holds for finite lifetime but for infinite 
lifetime it only holds when labor supply is endogenous. The transitional impact of a tighter 
environmental policy is also investigated. 
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This article challenges the conventional result that a tighter environmental tax
has no long-run eﬀect on human capital accumulation in the presence of pollution
arising from ﬁnal output production. It demonstrates that the technology used in
the abatement sector determines the existence and the direction of the growth-eﬀect.
A tighter environmental tax rises (respectively reduces) human capital accumulation
in the presence of pollution arising from ﬁnal production, if the abatement sector is
relatively more intensive in human (resp. physical) capital than ﬁnal sector. That
result always holds for ﬁnite lifetime but for inﬁnite lifetime it only holds when labor
supply is endogenous.
The transitional impact of a tighter environmental policy is also investigated.
Keywords : Growth; Environment; Overlapping generations; Human capital; Abate-
ment.
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11 Introduction
The role of the human capital accumulation on economic growth has been substantially
investigated.1 Nevertheless, the inﬂuence of the environmental taxation on education and
growth has not been studied extensively at theoretical level. Moreover, the few existing
articles ﬁnd that environmental tax has no long-run impact on human capital accumulation
when ﬁnal output is the source of pollution (Gradus and Smulders, 1993; Hettich, 1998).
Our article re-examines this ﬁnding (i) by extending the analysis of the environment-growth
nexus with education to ﬁnitely-lived agents and (ii) by relaxing the basic assumption of a
similar production technology in ﬁnal output and abatement sectors. It demonstrates that
the technology used in the abatement sector determines the existence and the direction
of the growth-eﬀect. Therefore it improves our understanding of how environmental tax
impacts long-run growth when education is the channel of transmission.
This article is in line with the seminal contribution of Gradus and Smulders (1993). In a
model à la Lucas (1988) where physical capital is the source of pollution, they demonstrate
that the environment promotes the steady-state growth rate when pollution depreciates the
stock of human capital. Van Ewijk and Van Wijnbergen (1995) obtain a similar result by
considering that pollution reduces the ability to train. Therefore, they conclude that the
environmental tax never inﬂuences human capital accumulation in the long-run if educa-
tional activities are not directly aﬀected by pollution. Hettich (1998) introduces endogenous
labor supply assuming no direct impact of pollution on human capital accumulation. He
ﬁnds that the environmental tax promotes education and growth, through the channel of
labor supply. Because the increase in the environmental tax compels ﬁrms to increase their
abatement activities at the expense of the household’s consumption, households substitute
leisure to education to counteract this negative eﬀect, and the growth rate rises. However,
Hettich (1998) demonstrates that his result holds only when pollution arises from physical
capital. When ﬁnal output is the source of pollution, a tighter environmental policy re-
duces both the returns to physical capital and the wage rate that is a part of the returns
to education. The incentives of agents to invest more in education vanish and the long-run
growth rate is not aﬀected by pollution tax.
Recently, Pautrel (2011) re-examines those ﬁndings by enlarging the inﬁnite lifetime
model of Gradus and Smulders (1993) to ﬁnitely-lived agents. He demonstrates that the
1For more details, see for example, the texbook of Acemoglu (2009), among others.
2result found by the two authors does not hold anymore. When physical capital is the
source of pollution and agents have ﬁnite lifetime, a tighter environmental tax enhances
human capital accumulation in the long-run whereas pollution does not aﬀect educational
activities and labor supply is inelastic. Finite lifetime introduces a turnover of generations
that disconnects the aggregate consumption growth to the interest rate and promotes the
investment in human capital accumulation. Nevertheless, the author does not extend his
analysis to the case of a pollution arising from ﬁnal production.
An another important recent contribution is the one by Grimaud and Tournemaine
(2007). They study the role of education in the environment-growth nexus, in a model with
R&D and human capital accumulation à la Lucas (1988). They demonstrate that a tighter
environmental policy promotes growth when education directly enters the utility function
as a consumption good. They depart from the basic structure of a similar technology
between output sector and abatement sector by modeling a R&D sector aimed at creating
knowledge to reduce the ﬂow of pollution emissions. A higher environmental tax rises the
price of the good whose production pollutes and therefore the relative cost of education
diminishes. Agents reduce their investment in human capital accumulation and because
education is the engine of growth, the growth rises at the steady-state. As highlighted by
the authors, the way education inﬂuences utility is crucial to their results and the more
realistic way they model abatement technology is important as well. It is the reason why
the role played by the technology of abatement sector in the environment-growth nexus
with education must be studied.
In the present article, we re-examine the environment growth-nexus with education
when pollution arises from ﬁnal output assuming that lifetime is ﬁnite and relaxing the
basic assumption of a similar technology in ﬁnal output and abatement sectors.2 We use
the Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985) overlapping generations model with environment and
we study both long-run and short-run outcome of a tighter environmental tax.
The contribution of this article is threefold. First, with the basic assumption of similar
technology across sectors, we demonstrate that the results found by Gradus and Smulders
(1993) and Hettich (1998) can be generalized to ﬁnite lifetime: the environmental tax has
2For the sake of simplicity, we will just take into account the diﬀerences of relative factor intensity in
ﬁnal output and abatement sectors. More complex and more realistic modeling of abatement activities (like
Grimaud and Tournemaine, 2007) is out of the scope of this article. Our results should be easily extended
to such a modeling.
3no growth eﬀect in the long-run when ﬁnal output is the source of pollution. That ﬁnding is
conﬂicting with the result obtained by Pautrel (2011) that the generational turnover eﬀect
introduced by ﬁnite-lifetime leads the environmental policy to promote human capital in
the long-run when pollution arises from physical capital. Our result may be explained by
the fact that both the interest rate and the wage rate are reduced by a tighter environmental
tax on output. Therefore, the positive impact of the generational turnover eﬀect on human
capital accumulation found by Pautrel (2011) is oﬀset by the reduction of the returns to
education so that the positive impact of the environmental tax on growth vanishes.
Second, we demonstrate that, relaxing the basic assumption of similar factor intensities
in ﬁnal output and abatement sectors, leads to an impact of the environmental tax on
the long-run growth. The environmental tax will boost (respectively harm) long-run hu-
man capital accumulation when the abatement sector is relatively more intensive in human
capital (resp. physical capital) than the output sector. That result comes from the fact
that tighter environmental tax increases abatement activities and generates factor reallo-
cations between sectors. Because factorial intensities diﬀer across sectors, that leads to a
relative scarcity of the factor that is intensively used in the abatement sector. When the
abatement sector is relatively more intensive in human capital (resp. physical capital), the
reward of human capital relatively to the reward of physical capital rises (resp. diminishes).
Agents are incited to invest more (resp. less) in education and human capital accumulation
increases (resp. decreases). We also demonstrate that our result always holds for ﬁnite
lifetime but it holds for inﬁnite lifetime only when labor supply is endogenous. Therefore,
the ﬁndings of Gradus and Smulders (1993) in the case of exogenous labor supply and a
similar technology in abatement and output sectors remain valid when technologies between
sectors diﬀer.3 Because, it is empirically relevant to consider that the abatement sector is
more intensive in human capital than the output sector, our results suggest that, even if
the source of pollution is ﬁnal output, tighter environmental tax will enhance the long-run
human capital accumulation as long as lifetime is ﬁnite and/or labor supply is endogenous.
Finally, we investigate whether the role played by the diﬀerence of technology in ﬁnal
output and abatement sectors also exists when pollutant emissions originate from physical
capital. We demonstrate that, in such a case, the environmental policy always promote
3The reason comes from the exogenous nature of the eﬃciency of time allocated to educational activities.
With exogenous labor supply, the expression of the time invested in education is similar to the one ﬁnd by
Lucas (1988) and it is therefore independent from the environmental tax.
4long-run human capital accumulation whatever the technologies used in ﬁnal output sec-
tor and in the abatement sector. As previously mentioned, when the abatement sector is
relatively more intensive in physical capital, the reward of physical capital relatively to the
reward of human capital increases. Nevertheless, compared with the case where output is
taxed, this increase is lower because the environmental policy only diminishes the interest
rate and not the wage rate. Therefore the downward pressure of the environmental tax on
the interest rate always compensate the aforementioned increase in the relative reward of
physical capital, so that the global impact is a higher human capital accumulation.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 gives the basic framework of the model.
Section 3 investigates the long-run inﬂuence of the environmental tax on the economy and
its impact during the transition. Section 4 studies the case where pollution arises from
physical capital. Section 5 concludes.
2 The general framework
2.1 The households’ behaviour
We use the Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985) overlapping generations model with human cap-
ital accumulation and environmental concerns. Time is continuous. Each individual born
at time s faces a constant probability of death per unit of time   0. Consequently his life
expectancy is 1=. When  increases, the life span decreases. At time s, a cohort of size 
is born. At time t  s, the cohort born at s has a size equal to N(s;t) = e (t s) and the
constant population is equal to N(t) =
R t
 1 N(s;t)ds = 1. There are insurance companies
and there is no bequest motive.
The expected utility function of an agent born at s  t is:
Z 1
s
[logc(s;t) + l logl(s;t)    logS(t)]e (%+)(t s)dt (1)
where c(s;t) denotes consumption in period t of an agent born at time s, %  0 is the rate
of time preference, S(t) is the stock of pollution at date t and  > 0 measures the weight
in utility attached to the environment. l(s;t) is leisure time at date t of an agent born at
date s  t.
The representative agent can increase his stock of human capital by devoting time to
schooling, according to Lucas (1988). Because each agent allocates a part u(s;t) 2]0;1[ of
5her time to production, a part l(s;t) 2]0;1[ in leisure, her remaining time for education is
1   u(s;t)   l(s;t). The temporal evolution of the individual stock of human capital is
_ h(s;t) = B [1   u(s;t)   l(s;t)]h(s;t) (2)
where B is the eﬃciency of schooling activities and h(s;t) is the stock of human capital at
time t of an individual born at time s. Conveniently, we assume that the human capital of
the agent when he borns, h(s;s), is inherited from the dying generation. To capture the
intergenerational transmission of knowledge, we follow Bovenberg and Van Ewijk (1997)
considering that newborn inherit from the dying generation the average aggregate human
capital stock, that is h(s;s) = H(s) (population being equal to unity).4
Households face the following budget constraint:
_ a(s;t) = [rn(t) + ]a(s;t) + u(s;t)h(s;t)w(t)   c(s;t) (3)
where a(s;t) is the ﬁnancial wealth in period t, w(t) represents the wage rate per eﬀective
unit of human capital u(s;t)h(s;t) and rn is the after-tax interest rate.5 In addition to the
budget constraint, there exists a transversality condition which must be satisﬁed to prevent







The representative agent chooses the time path for c(s;t) and his working time u(s;t) by
maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3). It yields
_ c(s;t) = [rn   %]c(s;t) (4)





Integrating (3) and (4) and combining the results gives the consumption at time t of an
agent born at time s:
c(s;t) = (% + )[a(s;t) + !(s;t)]
4Assuming that h(t;t) = H(t) with  2]0;1[ would not modify our qualitative results. Proof upon
request.
5We introduce the after-tax interest rate rn because in section 4 we will study the impact of an envi-
ronmental tax on physical capital income. For the moment there is no tax on physical capital income and





t [rn()+]dd is the present value of lifetime
earning. It also gives:
_ w(t)
w(t)
+ B[1   l(s;t)] = rn(t) +  (6)
the equality between the rate of returns to human capital (the left-hand side) and the
eﬀective rate of interest (the interest rate on the debt plus the insurance premium the agent
has to pay when borrowing ). It is straightforward from that relationship that the time
allocated to leisure is the same for all individuals whatever her date of birth: l(s;t) = l(t).









 1 !(s;t)e (t s)ds is aggregate human wealth in the economy. The










2.2 Production sectors, the Government and the Environment
There are two production sectors that operate under perfect competition: one produces
ﬁnal output denoted G, the other produces abatement services denoted D. National income
measured in terms of ﬁnal output is6
Y = G + PDD (9)
where PD is the relative price of abatement services in terms of ﬁnal output production.
6We introduce National income because we want our modeling to replicate the Hettich (1998)’ model
when the ﬁnal output sector and the abatement sector share the same production technology. In Hettich
(1998) abatement services are made with ﬁnal output and therefore are taxed as a source of pollution (see
below). Assuming that ﬁnal output is only taxed would give the same qualitative results. Proof upon
request.
7We assume that production sectors are the source of pollution and the government
imposes a tax tY 2]0;1[ upon National income. Furthermore, we consider that the tax
revenue tY Y is completely used by the government to fund the purchases of the abatement
services. Therefore
tY Y = PDD (10)




G and G = (1   tY )Y (11)
The ﬁnal output G is produced with the following technology:
G = (K)( Hp)1 ; with ;  ;  2]0;1[





) that is used in output production (which represents
a part   2]0;1[ of Hp). And K is the part of the physical capital stock used in output
production. Firms in the ﬁnal output sector maximize proﬁt (1  tY )G rK  w Hp by
equating factor rewards to marginal productivity:
r = (1   tY )
G
K




The abatement sector produces abatement services aimed at curbing the emissions of
pollution. Physical and human capital are used in the abatement sector with the following
constant-returns technology:
D = [(1   )K]
" [(1    )Hp]
1 " ; with " 2 [0;1]
Note that when " =  the abatement services sector uses the same technology than output
sector, that is abatement services are produced with output. When " = 1 we are in the
case of Michel and Rotillon (1995) where only physical capital is used in the production of
abatement services. Proﬁt maximisation in the abatement services sector gives:
w = (1   ")(1   tY )
PDD
(1    )Hp









(1   ")(1   tY ) tY G
(1    )Hp
From (12) we have
(1 tY )G
K = " tY G
(1 )K, that is
 =
(1   tY )







(1   )(1   tY )
(1   )   ("   )tY
When " = , we obtain  =   = 1   tY and therefore G = (1   tY )KH1 
p , PDD =
tY KH1 
p and Y = KH1 
p like in Hettich (1998).
The stock of pollution, denoted by S, evolves according to two opposite forces. On the
one hand, it increases in the net ﬂow of pollution, the pollutant emissions to abatement
services ratio Y=D. On the other hand, it decreases due to a natural rate of decay  > 0,
such that:





  S; with f() > 0; f0() > 0; f00() > 0
2.3 The general equilibrium and the balanced growth path
National income is used either to ﬁnance abatment purchase (equal to tY Y ), either to
consume, either to invest in physical capital. Therefore, the market clearing condition is:
(1   tY )Y = C + _ K:
with _ K = dK=dt. Diﬀerentiating (8) with respect to time and using the fact that u(s;t) =
u,7 the aggregate accumulation of human capital is:
_ H = B [1   u   l]H
7Using (12), the equalization of the rates of returns given by equation (6) implies that the rate of
returns to human capital is independent of s, therefore all individuals allocate the same eﬀort to schooling:
u(s;t) = u.
9Because in that section there is no tax on physical capital income we have rn = r, and
diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to time, using the expression of dK=dt, d
=dt and equation
(4) we obtain:
_ C=C = r   %    (% + )K=C (14)
The last term in the right-hand side represents the generational turnover eﬀect that arises
because some agents die at each date and therefore the aggregate consumption growth is
reduced. The generational turnover eﬀect increases in the probability to die : on one
hand, agents die at a higher frequency (that increases the generational turnover) and on
the other hand the propensity to consume out of wealth %+ rises due to the shorter horizon.
Deﬁning x  C=K, z  H=K, the model is given by three following dynamical equations
_ x=x = [(1   tY )   (tY )]	(tY ) 1(z u)1    %   ( + %)x 1 + x (D1.1)
_ z=z = B [1   u   l]   (tY )	(tY ) 1(z u)1  + x (D2.1)
_ u=u =  1 
B(1   l)      (1   tY )	(tY ) 1(z u)1 









1      ("   )tY
 + ("   )tY

and (tY )   =
(1   tY )
 + ("   )tY
; (T1)
and by one static relation:
l =
l
(1   tY )(1   )

x u
	(tY )(z u)1  (S1)
The balanced growth path equilibrium (hereafter BGP) is a stationary equilibrium
where u = u?, z = z?, x = x? are deﬁned by _ x = _ z = _ u = 0 and l = l?.
Proposition 1. Under the condition B >  + %, there exists a unique balanced growth
path equilibrium along which u? 2]( + %)=B;1[ solves  Y (u?;	(tY )) = 0 with













Bu      %
:
8Let us remark that when the abatement services are produced with the same technology than ﬁnal
output (" = ), we obtain  =   = 1.
10Proof. See appendix A. 
Furthermore, along the BGP equilibrium the consumption to physical capital ratio is
x? =
( + %)
Bu?      %
> 0





B(1   l?)   
(1   tY )
1=(1 )
> 0








B     
s
(B   )2   4l
B ( + %) u?







Finally, the growth rate is:
g? = B(1   u?   l?) > 0
3 The environmental tax and the growth rate
In this section, we investigate the link between the environmental taxation and the rate of
growth when pollution arises from production sectors. We will ﬁrst take a look at the BGP
equilibrium and then we will study the transition of the economy after an increase in the
tax rate to highlight the economic mechanisms underlying the inﬂuence of the tax on the
BGP equilibrium.
Proposition 2.
(i) When ﬁnal output production and abatement production share the same technology and
pollution arises from ﬁnal output, tighter environmental tax has no impact on the long-run
rate of growth in the case of ﬁnite lifetime, even if labor supply is endogenous.
(ii) Except in the case of inﬁnite lifetime ( = 0) and exogenous labor supply (l = 0), if
pollution arises from ﬁnal output, tighter environmental tax promotes (respectively harms)
human capital accumulation in the long-run when the abatement sector is relatively more
11(resp. less) intensive in human capital than the ﬁnal output sector. When lifetime is
inﬁnite and labor supply is exogenous, the environmental tax does not aﬀect the long-run
accumulation of human capital whatever the factor intensities.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Point (i) of proposition 2 states that the conventional ﬁndings the environmental tax does
not aﬀect education in the long-run when labor supply is exogenous and lifetime is inﬁnite
may be generalized to the ﬁnite lifetime case. It is in opposition with the result found by
Pautrel (2011) when the source of pollution is physical capital. Furthermore, Proposition
2 states that the “labor supply mechanism” found by Hettich (1998) with inﬁnite lifetime
does not operate anymore when ﬁnite lifetime is taken into account.
To understand that result, we examine the inﬂuence of a tightening environmental tax
during the transition of the economy towards the new BGP equilibrium. Because studying
analytically the transition is cumbersome, we perform a numerical analysis using the Time-
Elimination Method (see Mulligan and Sala-i Martin, 1991, 1993). We calibrate the model
to obtain realistic values of the growth rate of GDP and the probability of death for the US
economy. From the World Development Indicators 2005 by the World Bank, life expectancy
was 77.4 years in 2003 and the growth rate was 3.3% during the period 1990-2002. Since
the expected lifetime is the reverse of the probability of death per unit of time , we want
 to be close to 1=77:4 = 0:0128. We adjust other variables to obtain such values for our
benchmark case. We investigate the inﬂuence of the technology during the transition by
considering two polar cases : " = 0 (to study " < ) and " = 1 (to study " > ). In the ﬁrst
case (resp. the second case), the abatement sector only uses human capital (resp. physical
capital), that is  = 1 (resp.   = 1).9
Table 1 gives the benchmark value of parameters and Table 2 summarizes the exercise
of comparative statics. Graph 1 to 3 (at the end of the article) draw the temporal evolution
of the main variables towards the new steady-state when an unanticipated increase in
the environmental tax is implemented by the government, respectively for  = " = 1=3,
 > " = 0 and  < " = 1.
Graph 1 helps to illustrate the economic mechanisms underlying the Proposition 2(i).
At the impact, the tighter environmental policy brings down the returns to physical capital
9For " = 0, we obtain @=@tY = 0. Otherwise @=@tY < 0. For " = 1, we obtain @ =@tY = 0. Otherwise
@ =@tY < 0. Furthermore @	(tY )=@tY  0 for   ".
12Table 1: Benchmark value of parameters
 % B  "
1/3 0.025 0.085 0.0128 1/3
Table 2: The increase in the environmental tax along the BGP
" 1=3 0 1
tY 0:01 0:1 0:01 0:1 0:01 0:1
g?(%) 3.667 3.667 3.674 3.732 3.653 3.520
u? 0.481 0.481 0.480 0.476 0.482 0.490
l? 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.085 0.089 0.096
x? 0.158 0.158 0.160 0.179 0.154 0.125
z? 0.181 0.209 0.184 0.247 0.175 0.156
r? +  0.0775 0.0775 0.0776 0.0778 0.0775 0.0769
(r) and the wage rate (w) such that the ratio w=r rises (see Graph 1.i & 1.ii). The decrease
in the wage rate reduces the returns to education but globally (taking into account the
eﬀect of leisure) the returns to education is higher than the returns to physical capital
investment and the diﬀerence becomes positive (see Graph 1.iii). Agents allocate a part
of their resources from ﬁnal output to human capital accumulation: u jumps downward
(see Graph 1.iv). Due to the combined fall of u and w, the present value of lifetime
earnings drops and agents arise their saving: consumption falls at impact and therefore
the aggregate consumption to physical capital ratio (x) jumps downward because K is pre-
determined (see Graph 1.v). Because the fall in w is higher than the fall in the aggregate
consumption, leisure time chosen by individuals jumps at the impact (see Graph 1.vi) and
reduces the rewards to education but globally the returns to education remains higher than
the returns to physical capital (see Graph 1.iii). The greater investment in education leads
to a substitution between physical capital and human capital: z rises continuously during
the transition (recall that physical capital investment requires polluting ﬁnal output) as
shown in Graph 1.vii. The rise in z increases the interest rate and therefore reduces the
gap between the two returns to capital: during the transition u rises and that contributes
(with the rise of z) to diminish more the wage rate w (see Graph 1.ii). Furthermore, when
13the interest rate goes back to its initial value, the ratio aggregate consumption to physical
capital x backs to its initial value. Therefore, despite the generational turnover eﬀect that
disconnects the aggregate consumption growth to the interest rate (the term (%+)x 1 in
equation 14), the aggregate consumption growth backs to its initial value and the physical
capital rate of growth as well (see Graph 1.viii & 1.ix). The human capital accumulation
is then back to its initial level (see Graph 1.x), that is to say u, l and all variables back
to their initial value except the wage rate and the aggregate human capital to aggregate
physical capital ratio z (see Graph 1.ii & 1.vii). It is higher because of the substitution
between the stocks of capital. Therefore a tighter environmental tax has no impact on the
long-run growth rate (see Graph 1.xi).
Point (ii) of proposition 2 states that assuming a diﬀerent technology for ﬁnal output
production and abatement services production leads to two important insights. First, the
environmental tax inﬂuences the BGP rate of growth. That result challenges the conven-
tional result that the environmental tax does not aﬀect the growth rate when pollution
arises from ﬁnal output, in the Lucas (1988) settings, originally demonstrated by Gradus
and Smulders (1993) and extended to the case of endogenous labor supply by Hettich
(1998). Second, according to the relative factor intensity of each sector, the inﬂuence of
the environmental tax may be positive or negative. When the abatement sector is more
(respectively less) intensive in human capital than the ﬁnal output sector, that is  > "
(resp.  < "), the environmental tax enhances (resp. reduces) the BGP rate of growth.
When the same technology is used for ﬁnal production and abatement production ( = "),
the environmental tax does not aﬀect BGP growth.
That result my be explained as follows. At the impact, the tighter environmental tax
has two eﬀects: (i) it reduces the rewards to physical capital (r) and to human capital (w),
(ii) it leads to a reallocation of factors between the ﬁnal output sector and the abatement
sector when the technology used in both sectors are diﬀerent. That second impact is the
source of the positive (resp. negative) inﬂuence of the environmental policy on long-run
growth when the abatement sector is more (resp. less) intensive in human capital than the
ﬁnal output sector, that is when  > " (resp.  < ").
When the abatement sector is relatively intensive in human capital, the increase in the
environmental tax leads to a rise in abatement services production, requiring more human
capital. Because human capital is freed from the output sector relatively more intensive
14in physical capital, there is a higher pressure on the human capital rewards: w does not
fall at the impact as it did with the same factor intensity in both sectors (compare Graph
2.ii with Graph 1.ii). Conversely r falls more because more physical capital is relatively
released for one input of human capital reallocated from the output sector to the abatement
sector (compare Graph 2.i with Graph 1.i). As a consequence, the drop of the aggregate
consumption to physical capital ratio x at the impact is lowered (see Graph 2.v) and the
drop of u is higher because the gap between returns is higher (see Graph 2.iii). Therefore the
jump of l is reduced (see Graph 2.vi). Adjustment mechanisms towards the new balanced-
growth path equilibrium are similar to the case  = ": x and z rise, l falls. Nevertheless
the amplitude of variations is magniﬁed and x and l go respectively above and below their
initial values (see Graph 2.v & 2.vi). The human capital accumulation is boosted while the
accumulation of physical capital drops more (see Graph 2.x & 2.viii) so that the equalization
of returns is made for a value of u lower than its initial value as shown in Graph 2.iv (it is
also due to a greater increase of z).
When the abatement sector is relatively intensive in physical capital ( < "), mech-
anisms are modiﬁed. Because the tighter environmental tax rises the production in the
abatement sector, due to the diﬀerence in factor intensities between sectors, physical capi-
tal is relatively scarce and therefore despite the negative impact of the tighter environmental
tax, the interest rate jumps at the impact (see Graph 3.i). On the other hand, the freed
human capital in the output sector reinforces the fall-oﬀ in the wage rate due to the tighter
environmental tax (see Graph 3.ii). As a result, the diﬀerence between the returns to human
capital and the physical capital becomes negative at the impact (see Graph 3.iii) and agents
reallocate their human capital towards output production: u rises at the impact (see Graph
3.iv). In the same time, the reduction in the wage rate diminishes the discounted value of
earnings (human wealth) while the interest payments on non-human wealth rises: agents
increase their saving and consumption jumps downward the impact: x falls because K is
pre-determined (see Graph 3.v). Due to the increase in u, the human capital accumulation
falls at the impact while the higher interest rate leads to an increase in the investment in
physical capital (see Graph 3.x & 3.viii). That reinforces the drop in x, favoring the in-
crease in l at the impact and during the transition (see Graph 3.vi). Finally, the aggregate
human capital to aggregate physical capital ratio z falls towards a new long-run value lower
than the initial value (see Graph 3.vii). That fall leads the interest rate to be lower in the
long-run, that is when the gap between returns vanished (see Graph 3.i). That leads to a
15new steady-state rate of growth lower than its initial value (see Graph 3.xi). The tighter
environmental reduces the long-run growth rate.
4 Discussion
In the previous section we demonstrated that the environmental policy aﬀects long-run
growth in a Lucas (1988)’ model even if the source of pollution is ﬁnal output, when pro-
duction technology in the abatement sector diﬀers from the production technology in the
ﬁnal output sector. We also demonstrated that this inﬂuence of the environmental policy
on growth could be either positive or negative. The purpose of this section is to investigate
whether the conventional positive impact of the environmental tax on growth with phys-
ical capital as the source of pollution remains valid when abatement technology is modiﬁed.
We assume that physical capital is the source of pollution and therefore physical capital
income is taxed at a rate tk. Therefore, the after-tax real interest rate is rn = (1   tk) r
and equation (10) becomes:
tkrK = PDD (15)








w = (1   )
G
 Hp
= (1   ")
PDD
(1    )Hp
(16b)
Using (15) and dividing member by member equations (16a) and (16b), we obtain












that is   =
(1   )"
("   ) + (1   ")

From (15), we also have r = "
tkrK
(1 )K, that is
 = 1   "tk > 0







G. Because ﬁnal output is used for consumption










G = C + _ K
16Therefore, the dynamical system is
_ x=x = [(1   tk)   1   (   ")tk](tk) 1(z u)1    %   ( + %)x 1 + x (D2.1)
_ z=z = B(1   u   l)   (1 + (   ")tk)(tk) 1(z u)1  + x (D2.2)
_ u=u =  1 
B(1   l)      (1   tk)(z u)1 
  _ z=z (D3.2)
where (tk) 

  = 1 +  "
1 tk (with tk(tk)  0 if   "),10 and
l =
l
(1   )(tk) 
x u
(z u)1  (S2)
Solving the dynamic system gives the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If pollution arises from the stock of physical capital, tighter environmental
tax promotes long-run human capital accumulation whatever the relative factor intensity in
the abatement sector and the ﬁnal output sector.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Proposition 3 states that abatement technology does not impact the growth-eﬀect of
the environmental policy when physical capital is the source of pollution. That result may
be explained in the case  < " (the abatement sector is relatively more intensive in physical
capital) as follows. When physical capital is taxed, the relative factor reward r=w drop
more (with respect to the case where output is taxed). Therefore, the time allocated to
production (u) diminishes more and the fall of the interest rate is so high that even if
physical capital is relatively scarce in output production (because abatement production
is relatively more intensive in physical capital), the rising force due to that scarcity is not
enough to make the interest rate jumping upward at the impact. Therefore, the overall
adjustment mechanisms remain the same whatever the relative factorial intensity in ﬁnal
output and abatement sectors.
10Let us remark that when the abatement services are produced with the same technology than ﬁnal
output (" = ), we obtain  =   = 1   "tk. Therefore, G = (1   "tk)K
H
1 









The aim of the article is to re-examine the growth-eﬀects of a tighter environmental tax
when the source of pollution is ﬁnal output and human capital accumulation is the engine
of growth. Compared with previous articles, we take into account ﬁnitely-lived agents and
we relax the basic assumption that technologies of production are similar in ﬁnal output
and abatement sectors.
We demonstrate that the results found by Gradus and Smulders (1993) and Hettich
(1998) can be generalized to ﬁnite lifetime when production technology across sectors is
similar: the environmental tax has no growth-eﬀect if pollution arises from ﬁnal output.
Nevertheless, we demonstrate that the environmental tax will boost (respectively harm)
long-run human capital accumulation when the abatement sector is relatively more intensive
in human capital (resp. physical capital) than the output sector. That result always holds
for ﬁnite lifetime but for inﬁnite lifetime it holds only when labor supply is endogenous.
Therefore, the ﬁndings of Gradus and Smulders (1993) in the case of exogenous labor supply
and a similar technology in abatement and output sectors remain valid when technologies
between sectors diﬀer. Our ﬁnal contribution is to demonstrate that the environmental
policy always promote long-run human capital accumulation whatever the technologies
used in ﬁnal output sector and in the abatement sector, when pollutant emissions originate
from physical capital.
Thus our article gives new important insights to understand how environmental tax
impacts long-run growth when education is the channel of transmission. Highlighting that
the technology used in the abatement sector determines the existence and the direction of
the growth-eﬀect, it calls for more interest in the modeling of the abatement “side” of the
growth model with environment.
18Graph 1.  = " (to be continued...)






















































































































































































20Graph 2.  > " (to be continued...)













































































































































































22Graph 3.  < " (to be continued...)
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26A Existence, unicity and stability of the balanced growth
path equilibrium
A.1 The case  > 0 and l > 0
From (D3.1), _ u = 0, we obtain
(z? u?)1  =
	(tY )1 
(1   tY )
[B(1   l?)   ] (A.1)
Because z? u? > 0, it implies
B(1   l?)    > 0 ) B >  (cond1)
Equation (S1) also deﬁnes a relation between l? and z?u?:
l? =
l x? u?
(1   )(1   tY )	(tY )(z?u?)1 
such that using (A.1), we obtain
l? =
l
(1   )	(tY )

x? u?
B(1   l?)   
(A.2)
Therefore (A.2) gives the expression of l? 2 [0;1[:11





B     
q
(B   )2   4
l





x?(x?;u?;	(tY )) > 0; ~ LY
u?(x?;u?;	(tY )) > 0; ~ LY
	(tY )(x?;u?;	(tY )) < 0. Further-
more, from (D1.1) and (D2.1), _ x   _ z = 0 at the steady-state gives (with A.1):
x? =
( + %)
Bu?      %
(A.3)




with B >  + % (cond2)
11Equation (A.2) is a quadratic equation of l
? that have one positive and one negative solution. Only
the positive one is interesting for us.
27Therefore, x? u? is an increasing function of u? and deﬁning (u?)  x? u?, we can express
the endogenous labor supply at steady-state as:
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q







u?(u?;	(tY )) > 0;  LY
	(tY )(u?;	(tY )) < 0. _ z = 0 leads to, using (D2.1), (A.1) and
(T1):












1    LY (u?;	(tY ))

(A.5)
Equating (A.3) and (A.5) enables to express u? as the solution of
 Y (u;	(tY )) = 0
where













Bu      %
with  Y
u (u;	(tY )) > 0 and  Y
	(tY )(u;	(tY )) > 0
because
 Y
u (u;	(tY )) = B +
B( + %)








From (cond2), u? 2]( + %)=B;1[ with B >  + %. We have limu!(+%)=B =  1 and
limu!1 > 0 because B  % > (+%) (suﬃcient condition). Therefore, u? 2](+%)=B;1[
is unique.
From the theorem of the implicit function we have
u? =  UY (	(tY )) with  UY
	(tY )(	(tY )) < 0
From (T1), we have 	tY (tY ) T 0 when  T ", therefore it comes
u? = UY (tY ) with UY
tY (tY )  0 when   "
From (A.4), we obtain that
l? = LY (tY ) with LY
tY (tY )  0 when   "
As a result
g? = B(1   UY (tY )   LY (tY )) with g?
tY  0 when   "
28A.2 The case  = 0
When lifetime is inﬁnite,  = 0 and the ﬁve equations (D1.1-D3.1, T1, S1) becomes:
_ x=x = [(1   tY )   (tY )]	(tY ) 1(z u)1    % + x (D1.1a)
_ z=z = B(1   u   l)   (tY )	(tY ) 1(z u)1  + x (D2)
_ u=u =  1 
B(1   l)   (1   )	(tY ) 1(z u)1 
  _ z=z (D3.1a)
To obtain the expression of the BGP rate of growth, just recall that g? = r? % where r?
is the interest rate along the BGP deﬁned as r? = (1 )	(tY ) 1(z? u?)1 . Therefore,
along the BGP _ u = 0, implies that








(1   tY )

r? = % + 	(tY )r?





















r? + 	(tY )
i
%
whose the unique positive solution is:
r? =
(1   )B   l% +
p
((1   )B   l%)2   4l(1   )%2=	(tY )
2(1   )
> 0
It is straightforward that @r?=@	(tY ) > 0, 8l > 0. Because @	(tY )=@tY  0 if and only if
  " then 8l > 0, @r?=@tY  0 if and only if   ". When l = 0, r? = B independent
from tY .
29B The balanced-growth path equilibrium when K is the source
of pollution




[B(1   l?)   ] (B.1)
with (tk)  1 +  "
1 tk. Because z? u? > 0, condition (cond1) B >  always holds.


















(tk)=@tk  0.12 Therefore (B.2) gives the expression
of l? 2 [0;1[:13





B     
q







x?(x?;u?;tk) > 0; ~ LK
u?(x?;u?;tk) > 0; ~ LK
tk(x?;u?;tk)  0. Furthermore, from
(D2.1) and (D2.2), _ x   _ z = 0 at the steady-state gives (with B.1):
x? =
( + %)
Bu?      %
(B.3)
Therefore, x? u? is an increasing function of u? and deﬁning (u?)  x? u?, we can express
the endogenous labor supply at steady-state as:
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  
q










[1 +( ")tk]2  0, 8(;") 2 (0;1).
13Equation (B.2) is a quadratic equation of l
? that have one positive and one negative solution. Only the
positive one is interesting for us.
30with  LK
u?(u?;tk) > 0;  LK
tk(u?;tk)  0. _ z = 0 leads to, using (D2.2) and (B.1):
x? = Bu?    +













Equating (B.3) and (B.5) enables to express u? as the solution of
 K(u;tk) = 0
where
 K(u;tk)  Bu?    +














Bu      %
with  K
u (u;tk) > 0 and  K







(1 tk)2 > 0. From (cond2), u? 2]( + %)=B;1[ with
B >  + %. We have limu!(+%)=B =  1 and limu!1 > 0 because B      % > ( + %)
(suﬃcient condition). Therefore, u? 2]( + %)=B;1[ is unique.
From the theorem of the implicit function we have
u? = UK(tk) with UK
tk (tk) < 0
From (B.4), we obtain that
l? = LK(tk) with LK
tk(tk) < 0
As a result
g? = B(1   UK(tk)   LK(tk)) with g?
tk > 0; 8(;") 2 [0;1]
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